Four ways to interpret quantum mechanics

One hundred years after its birth, quantum mechanics is the foundation of our understanding of the physical world. Yet debates on how to interpret the theory – especially the thorny question of what happens when we make a measurement – remain as lively today as during the 1930s.

The latest recognition of the fertility of studying the interpretation of quantum mechanics was the award of the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physics to Alain Aspect, John Clauser and Anton Zeilinger. The motivation for the prize pointed out that the bubbling field of quantum information, with its numerous current and potential technological applications, largely stems from the work of John Bell at CERN the 1960s and 1970s, which in turn was motivated by the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.

The majority of scientists use a textbook formulation of the theory that distinguishes the quantum system being studied from “the rest of the world” – including the measuring apparatus and the experimenter, all described in classical terms. Used in this orthodox manner, quantum theory describes how quantum systems react when probed by the rest of the world. It works flawlessly.

Sense and sensibility

The problem is that the rest of the world is quantum mechanical as well. There are of course regimes in which the behaviour of a quantum system is well approximated by classical mechanics. One may even be tempted to think that this suffices to solve the difficulty. But this leaves us in the awkward position of having a general theory of the world that only makes sense under special approximate conditions. Can we make sense of the theory in general?

Today, variants of four main ideas stand at the forefront of efforts to make quantum mechanics more conceptually robust. They are known as physical collapse, hidden variables, many worlds and relational quantum mechanics. Each appears to me to be viable a priori, but each comes with a conceptual price to pay. The latter two may be of particular interest to the high-energy community as the first two do not appear to fit well with relativity.

The idea of the physical collapse is simple: we are missing a piece of the dynamics. There may exist a yet-undiscovered physical interaction that causes the wavefunction to “collapse” when the quantum system interacts with the classical world in a measurement. The idea is empirically testable. So far, all laboratory attempts to find violations of the textbook Schrödinger equation have failed (see “Probing physical collapse” figure), and some models for these hypothetical new dynamics have been ruled out by measurements.

The second possibility, hidden variables, follows on from Einstein’s belief that quantum mechanics is incomplete. It posits that its predictions are exactly correct, but that there are additional variables describing what is going on, besides those in the usual formulation of the theory: the reason why quantum predictions are probabilistic is our ignorance of these other variables.

The work of John Bell shows that the dynamics of any such theory will have some degree of non-locality (see “Non-locality” image). In the non-relativistic domain, there is a good example of a theory of this sort, that goes under the name of de Broglie–Bohm, or pilot-wave theory. This theory has non-local but deterministic dynamics capable of reproducing the predictions of non-relativistic quantum-particle dynamics. As far as I am aware, all existing theories of this kind break Lorentz invariance, and the extension of hidden variable theories to quantum-field theoretical domains appears cumbersome.

Relativistic interpretations

Let me now come to the two ideas that are naturally closer to relativistic physics. The first is the many-worlds interpretation – a way of making sense of quantum theory without either changing its dynamics or adding extra variables. It is described in detail in this edition of CERN Courier by one of its leading contemporary proponents (see “The minimalism of many worlds“), but the main idea is the following: being a genuine quantum system, the apparatus that makes a quantum measurement does not collapse the superposition of possible measurement outcomes – it becomes a quantum superposition of the possibilities, as does any human observer.

If we observe a singular outcome, says the many-worlds interpretation, it is not because one of the probabilistic alternatives has actualised in a mysterious “quantum measurement”. Rather, it is because we have split into a quantum superposition of ourselves, and we just happen to be in one of the resulting copies. The world we see around us is thus only one of the branches of a forest of parallel worlds in the overall quantum state of everything. The price to pay to make sense of quantum theory in this manner is to accept the idea that the reality we see is just a branch in a vast collection of possible worlds that include innumerable copies of ourselves.

Relational interpretations are the most recent of the four kinds mentioned. They similarly avoid physical collapse or hidden variables, but do so without multiplying worlds. They stay closer to the orthodox textbook interpretation, but with no privileged status for observers. The idea is to think of quantum theory in a manner closer to the way it was initially conceived by Born, Jordan, Heisenberg and Dirac: namely in terms of transition amplitudes between observations rather than quantum states evolving continuously in time, as emphasised by Schrödinger’s wave mechanics (see “A matter of taste” image).

Observer relativity

The alternative to taking the quantum state as the fundamental entity of the theory is to focus on the information that an arbitrary system can have about another arbitrary system. This information is embodied in the physics of the apparatus: the position of its pointer variable, the trace in a bubble chamber, a person’s memory or a scientist’s logbook. After a measurement, these physical quantities “have information” about the measured system as their value is correlated with a property of the observed systems.

Quantum theory can be interpreted as describing the relative information that systems can have about one another. The quantum state is interpreted as a way of coding the information about a system available to another system. What looks like a multiplicity of worlds in the many-worlds interpretation becomes nothing more than a mathematical accounting of possibilities and probabilities.

The relational interpretation reduces the content of the physical theory to be about how systems affect other systems. This is like the orthodox textbook interpretation, but made democratic. Instead of a preferred classical world, any system can play a role that is a generalisation of the Copenhagen observer. Relativity teaches us that velocity is a relative concept: an object has no velocity by itself, but only relative to another object. Similarly, quantum mechanics, interpreted in this manner, teaches us that all physical variables are relative. They are not properties of a single object, but ways in which an object affects another object.

The QBism version of the interpretation restricts its attention to observing systems that are rational agents: they can use observations and make probabilistic predictions about the future. Probability is interpreted subjectively, as the expectation of a rational agent. The relational interpretation proper does not accept this restriction: it considers the information that any system can have about any other system. Here, “information” is understood in the simple physical sense of correlation described above.

Like many worlds – to which it is not unrelated – the relational interpretation does not add new dynamics or new variables. Unlike many worlds, it does not ask us to think about parallel worlds either. The conceptual price to pay is a radical weakening of a strong form of realism: the theory does not give us a picture of a unique objective sequence of facts, but only perspectives on the reality of physical systems, and how these perspectives interact with one another. Only quantum states of a system relative to another system play a role in this interpretation. The many-worlds interpretation is very close to this. It supplements the relational interpretation with an overall quantum state, interpreted realistically, achieving a stronger version of realism at the price of multiplying worlds. In this sense, the many worlds and relational interpretations can be seen as two sides of the same coin.

Every theoretical physicist who is any good knows six or seven different theoretical representations for exactly the same physics

I have only sketched here the most discussed alternatives, and have tried to be as neutral as possible in a field of lively debates in which I have my own strong bias (towards the fourth solution). Empirical testing, as I have mentioned, can only test the physical collapse hypothesis.

There is nothing wrong, in science, in using different pictures for the same phenomenon. Conceptual flexibility is itself a resource. Specific interpretations often turn out to be well adapted to specific problems. In quantum optics it is sometimes convenient to think that there is a wave undergoing interference, as well as a particle that follows a single trajectory guided by the wave, as in the pilot-wave hidden-variable theory. In quantum computing, it is convenient to think that different calculations are being performed in parallel in different worlds. My own field of loop quantum gravity treats spacetime regions as quantum processes: here, the relational interpretation merges very naturally with general relativity, because spacetime regions themselves become quantum processes, affecting each other.

Richard Feynman famously wrote that “every theoretical physicist who is any good knows six or seven different theoretical representations for exactly the same physics. He knows that they are all equivalent, and that nobody is ever going to be able to decide which one is right at that level, but he keeps them in his head, hoping that they will give him different ideas for guessing.” I think that this is where we are, in trying to make sense of our best physical theory. We have various ways to make sense of it. We do not yet know which of these will turn out to be the most fruitful in the future.